their contemporaries. Now, at the end of this century, particularly in the context of our high technology but limited resources for medicine, we often do not perceive the differences between what is right, what is wrong, and what can be tolerated. Why do so many of us in late 2Othcentury society have to search and research to discern these differences, differences that were seemingly so obvious to people in earlier times, differences that are seemingly so obvious still to some people in cultural and religious comers of our own societies?
Before proceeding any further, I should like to emphasize that ethics, as understood here, is a function of and an exercise of human intelligence. As such, ethics shares a common cognitive goal with science: to distinguish mere appearances from reality. Scientific research, using measurement as its cardinal procedure, seeks to find the actual relationships between phenomena. Uncritical reliance on initial observations, potentially distorted by bias, can lead to a systematic divergence from truth (2) .
Ethics, a process of interdisciplinary critical reflection, acts against a tendency to diverge systematically from what is right. Just as initial observations may fail to reveal true correlations between phenomena, so also may it happen that spontaneous desires or compulsions may not correspond to what is truly good and to what we really ought to do. What appears to be good in a limited perspective may contradict a greater and more commanding value. True values, like real correlations between phenomena, are not always immediately obvious. Value judgements, like judgements of fact and of truth, are governed by concurrence with sufficient evidence, not by submission to custom, convention, authority, sheer brilliance, or any overpowering attraction.
Within the classical notion of culture, ethics proceeded to distinguish right from wrong by
ETHICS: FROM INTEGRATION TO PLURALISM ETHICS: FROM THE THINKER TO OTHERS
The days when great thinkers, pondering in solitary silence, could work out the differences between right and wrong, the days when they could do this not only for themselves, but also for the rest of humankind -those days, I believe, are long gone.
Let us consider Voltaire, that exemplar of the Enlightenment. He marveled at how it took centuries of collaboration among scientists to work out a single law of nature, whereas it took a wise person only a few hours of thought, a day at most, to work out what a human being's duties were in life (1) .
No doubt we will always learn from and rejoice over the sagacious persons among us. But the days are now long gone when a wise person or two could, in solitary reflection, resolve the ethical and moral quandaries that baffled and buffeted I borrow these title words from John McPhee.
He used them in a recent interview on the Canadian Sunday afternoon radio program, Writers and Company. Mr. McPhee, who has written frequently for The New Yorker and who has published books on subjects ranging from oranges to tectonic plate theory and geology, was describing how difficult he used to find it, as a young man in his early twenties, to sit at a desk and work alone writing for hours and days on end. He needed discipline, so he literally tied himself to his chair. Thus immobilized, he could complete the work that required his solitary confinement and reflection. The days of having to tie himself to a chair are now long gone, he said.
Three elements in the McPhee interview -the idea of discipline, the activity of solitary thought, and the experience of having moved on, of some things now being long gone -are my starting point for my attempt to reflect, even if ever so briefly, on how ethics in palliative care and palliative medicine, the theme of this and the following number of the Journal, can be undertaken in this last decade of the century.
an appeal to the governing concepts of human nature and the human good. Ethics in the classical mode assumed three stabilities: the unchangeability of the human condition; agreement about what constitutes the human good; and quite fixed temporal and geographical limits on the reach and impact of human action (3) . These stabilities no longer hold. Human nature is now no longer simply a governing principle of human action. Human nature is also an unanswered question, and an unfinished project. There is now widespread disagreement on what is right and good, on What is wrong and bad, and on what is tolerable Ornot, among all the things that we can now do to and with, if not always for, human beings.
In the classical notion of culture and ethics, there was one set of beliefs, ideals, and norms, and these were assumed to be the standard of thought, word, and act for all human beings in all places and at all times. The scope of human duty, obligations, and rights, and the recognition of reprehensible behavior, were assumed to be readily accessible to, and comprehended by, the cultivated mind. It was within such a classicist notion of culture and ethics that Voltaire could claim that little more than a few hours thought Were needed for a wise person to work out the difference between right and wrong.
However, public life in Western societies is no longer lived in the classicist mode. We have passed from an integrated, universalist culture to a culturally, philosophically, and ethically fragmented and pluralist world. In this postclassicist world, ethics is neither a ready-made achievement nor a simple inheritance of principle, stored for all time in great books and great minds and waiting for universal application (4). In Western society, we largely find ourselves in the difficult situation of having to strive and struggle together to reconstruct standards that enable us to distinguish right from wrong when we differ as profoundly as we do on the level of beliefs and values.
ETHICS: FROM THEORETICAL TO PRACTICAL REASONING
1\ SOciety, as Nicolo Chiaromonte has written in his The Paradox of History, is not merely a Collection of individuals and cannot be reduced either to the sum total of the political and juridical institutions on which it rests or to its eConomic and cultural structures. Society also Consists of the beliefs on which members of a Community agree or clash (5) .
People in Western societies today clash profoundly on two levels: on the level of their worldview beliefs, the beliefs within which people find the goals of life and the costs of death; and on their hierarchies of value against which people decide which values may be sacrificed, if need be, and which values must be maintained at all costs.
In the context of such divergence, ethics requires a shift from a divergent to a convergent method and mode of thought. The shift required is from the task of constructing arguments to the work of constructing practical judgements about what must be done, what must be prohibited, and what can be tolerated. This shift is needed if we are ever to reach the decisions that often have to be made quite rapidly at the bedside of the sick and the dying. This is the shift required to extricate clinical ethics and the ethics of palliative care from the deadlock of interminable discourse about matters upon which people are likely never to agree (6) .
Ethics in palliative care is a matter of practical reasoning, not the deduction of correct clinical actions from self-evident principles. The first implication is that attempting to base palliative care ethics, not on practical judgements where people can agree, but rather on the reasons and arguments used to justify these judgements, entraps ethics in an ever more fragmenting process of divergent thinking.
Second, palliative care ethics requires comprehensive attention to the full particularity of individual patients, specific cases, and unique situations. Attention to this uniqueness, and respect for it, may well lead to decisions that we cannot show to be consistent with either widely accepted principles or decisions taken earlier in similar situations.
ETHICS: FROM THE WISDOM OF THE FEW TO THE PRUDENCE OF THE MANY
The shift from theoretical to practical reasoning emphasizes the importance of the Aristotelian dialectic in palliative care ethics. Aristotle's method to arrive at the best ethical judgements possible in any given situation was based on the assumption that people need to learn what they really think about a given issue. The dialectical method pits both the many and the wise, ordinary folk and experts, into discussion with each other. The aim is to unfold, to layout, the values and judgements of people who come to an issue with definite intuitions and value commitments. The mutually corrective interplay of these different views, achieved as people work through practical alternatives in dialogue and often in expedited dialogue at the bedside, is what Aristotle's dialectic involves (7) .
The root of ethics, as Bernard Lonergan has explained, is not found in sentences, propositions, principles, codes, or guidelines. The root of ethics is found in the unfolding of rational self-consciousness: the unfolding of the rational self-consciousness of many people involved in mutually corrective deliberation to reach the best possible judgements for specific cases and situations. Existing persons, not a priori propositions about principles, are the real root of ethics (8) .
The method of palliative care ethics is radical in Bernard Lonergan's sense and dialectical in Aristotle's sense because it seeks to derive an ethical order and related practical judgements from the prudential deliberation, interdisciplinary and intercultural, of existing persons striving to resolve specific issues.
This approach is what Gordon Dunstan has called a "new development in method" (9) . And Paul Ricoeur has reached back to Aristotle's term phronesis to characterize this method as one based upon the practical wisdom of the many, as a method based on the prudence of the many tune phronesis ii plusieurs) rather than on the persuasive brilliance in argument of the few (10) .
